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There is no experience which is not a way of thinking, and which can-
not be analysed from the point of view of the history of thought ... 
Michel Foucault. 
As introduction, I shall examine some aspects of the background to this 
paper concerning the transition, as I see it, from ethnocentrism in the eigh-
teenth century to genocide in the twentieth. 
When I came to reflect on the cultural construction of race, I posed some 
fairly obvious questions; How can one understand the concept (or 'idea', 
as Robert Miles in this volume has argued) of 'race' in the eighteenth cen-
tury when European voyagers began 'discovering' different societies at an 
increasingly rapid rate? Is it the same as the term we use today? Or is it that 
we tend to conflate two things; ethnocentrism, which has been with us for 
centuries, and today's term 'race'? I came to the view that the least one 
could do was pay some attention to what has been written about race, how 
it emerged within twentieth-century context, especially as regards Natural 
History and the writings of voyagers and naturalists. To begin in this way 
means that conclusions other than those we are used to have to be enter-
tained. We have to consider, for instance, the possibility that 'race' as it in-
itially appeared in Western thought had nothing to do with the notion of 
race we understand today, even if many historians fail to recognise this. 
Indeed, upon consideration, it seemed reasonably clear to me that what I 
call eighteenth-century ethnocentrism (exemplified in the thought of the 
Enlightenment) is certainly not the same thing as nineteenth- or twentieth-
century racism. Moreover, I contend that we are all ethnocentric up to a 
point, but not necessarily racist. 
In light of the above remarks, I now outline some of my own thought pro-
cesses in seeking to clarify the issues involved, and then discuss what I 
think are some pertinent arguments put forward by Michel Foucault about 
race and politics in the twentieth century. 
I am confining my remarks to a particular kind of discontinuity in Euro-
pean thinking about the 'other', one that is associated both with the change 
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from absolute monarchies to the rise of nation states in Europe and with 
Europe's developing hegemony over the colonial world. Like Foucault, I 
see discontinuities in history but to analyse them it is sometimes necessary 
to write as if history were continuous. 
What initially led to my reconsideration of the notion of race was my 
reading about the ethnocentrism of eighteenth-century voyagers' en-
counters with, or blindness to, the sacred and the profane in Pacific 
societies. In this context, I was particularly interested in Mary Douglas's 
study of the sacred; in Purity and Danger (1979) Douglas alludes to the 
paradox that the sacred is inscribed in the profane, a point that has been 
further exploited by Julia Kristeva in Powers of Horror (1982). Both 
Douglas's and Kristeva's treatment of the sacred, I thought, was bound to 
expose a European's blindness to the effect of the sacred in an alien 
culture, if not in their own. And indeed, to some extent I believe that this 
can be demonstrated. Part of what I have to say below will confirm this 
point. 
When we come to examine the views of the sacred expressed in the ac-
counts of members of Bougainville' s voyage in the Pacific, there is no 
doubt that we are confronted - as one might expect from the disciples of 
Rousseau- with ethnocentrist views regarding the non-European other's 
notion of the sacred (cf. Taillemite, 1977). This other, I thought I could 
show, with its own peculiar version of the sacred, would be a quintessen-
tially racial other. With just a slight change of register, I believed, this 
ethnocentrism could be seen as a form of racism- or at least as 'racentrism' 
resulting from thought that used race as one if its categories for describing 
the world. 
The Pacific, after all, is well-entrenched in Western mythology. The 'no-
ble' and/ or 'ignoble savage' can easily seem to offer the basis of a racist 
view of the world ( cf. B. Smith, 1969). I began to think that the sacred (let 
us define it loosely as a series of interdictions, as a system of 'inclusions' 
and 'exclusions', as well as that which is bound up with the inexpressible 
origin of society, the individual, of life) was the domain which, most of all, 
became the vehicle for constituting the other as inferior, that is, racially 
speaking. What scholars tell us today about the term tapu might even be 
seen to confirm this point. 
They argue that the key term tapu in Pacific cultures - a term which has to 
do with rituals relating to the sacred, with what should be done as well as 
with what should not be done - came to be understood as the exclusively 
interdictive term of European coinage, 'taboo'. Thus in the Pacific islands 
of the Marquesas, when the first Europeans arrived, women had to swim 
out to the ships because the canoes were tapu. Similarly, hogs were never 
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traded because they were tapu. Again, it was tapu for men to be below 
decks while women were above: tapu for men to eat with women or touch 
their clothing, or their sleeping mats (Dening 1980:51 ). And if tapu was all 
there was, then, for the eighteenth-century Frenchman especially, this was 
for the equivalent of there being no religious system at all. Bougainville, 
for instance, asked while at Tahiti whether the people had a religion. And 
he answered his own question by saying: 
I have seen no temple, no external manifestation of adoration: such acts 
of devotion as we have performed before [the Tahitians] have neither 
struck nor interested them. In the houses of the important people, large 
wooden figures are to be found, one of each sex. In order to establish 
whether these were idols, we went on bended knee before them, then 
spat at their feet, stepped upon them. Each of these very different acts 
drew the derision of the Indian spectators i 5 April 1758t (Taillemite, 
1977:328. My translation). 
Not to have tangible and familiar evidence of religion- of the sacred- was 
reason to doubt its presence. But what if the sacred were tied up with the 
intangible, the implicit, the inexpressible, the secret? Or what if the very 
absence of any outward, visible manifestation of the sacred were indeed a 
kind of negative index of its power? Might it not be, finally, that disguise is 
one of the sacred's most profound characteristics? Questions of this kind 
are not new: but they do nevertheless serve to remind us of the ambiguous 
and shifting boundary that emerges between two cultures and of two quite 
different modes of thought. We certainly have the basis of ethnocentrism 
here in European attitudes to the sacred, but do we have the basis of racism 
as well? This is the issue I elaborate in the following pages. My conclusion 
will suggest that an initial assumption about continuities between eigh-
teenth and twentieth century thinking need revision. We need to 
distinguish very clearly between eighteenth century ethnocentrism and 
twentieth century racism and not conflate the two. 
If there is an idea of race in the eighteenth century, it seems to be very dif-
ferent from that of the latter part of the nineteenth and of the twentieth 
century. Nevertheless, it also seems to be true that many eighteenth-
century forms of thought are still with us today. This is particularly so with 
regard to the law and politics; but, more specifically, what Rousseau says 
about 'natural' woman is still very influential in many quarters. Indeed, 
something seems to have occurred at the level of discourse and language 
- or more precisely, has not occurred- which has led to our commonly-
used terminology and modes of expression being out of kilter with the 
changing circumstances in which we find ourselves. 
In this regard, Jacques Attali in his book, Noise (1985), makes the point that 
it is not so much thought as music and its changes which often prefigure 
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and at times accompany social and economic changes. Thus, Attali writes 
that; 
[Music] heralds, for it is prophetic. It has always been in its essence a 
herald of times to come. Thus ... if it is true that the political organiza-
tion of the twentieth century is rooted in the political thought of the 
nineteenth, the latter is almost entirely present in embryonic form in 
the music of the eighteenth century (1985:4, emphasis in original). 
If we consider this point, we note that for some reason political discourse 
today is largely that of the juridical state: our references to sexuality and 
power are still largely those of the Romantics: our notions of the economy 
and society remain those of the theorists of wealth and the Social Contract. 
I am not only referring to the language of everyday life, but also to the 
language of specialists, and to the growing dominance in the late eigh-
teenth century of representation which made stereotypes possible. With 
the French Revolution there emerged in Europe a more or less fully 
developed state apparatus founded on the principle of representation (e.g., 
'state' = nation). The eighteenth century also bequeathed a mode of sub-
jectivity which corresponded to the conscious 'self or psychological sub-
ject, that is, an entirely secular subject which began to treat the irrational, 
the non-conceptual, the unrepresentable, the feminine and 'mystical' 
dimensions of the individual and the world (the sacred, in a word) with 
scepticism and disdain. 
With regard to race and racism, people still tend to speak as though these 
were the products of certain arrogant, egocentric nations, groups or in-
dividuals who are out to further their own interests against other nations, 
groups and individuals, largely through the use of force. We still speak, in-
deed, as though egotistical self-interest (a very eighteenth-century term if 
ever there was one) is at the heart of what is wrong with the world. This 
explains to me how (if not why) ethnocentrism and racism have been con-
flated. It is as though the language-cum-discourse of everyday life in the 
twentieth century has been bequeathed to us by the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries: and this can lead us to reflect upon the notion 
that even the category 'everyday life' and the attendant opposition of ap-
pearance and reality (which so concerned Rousseau and Kant, albeit in dif-
ferent ways) were also bequeathed to us by the nco-Platonism of the late 
eighteenth century. I say :1ll this simply as a reminder that the language we 
use needs to be reflt>cted upon at length. 
Turning back to the eighteenth century for a moment, I believe the 
ethnocentrism evident in the observations and interpretations of that time 
concerning various forms of exotic behaviours and the levels of so-called 
civilisation attained by very different peoples, was the result of more of a 
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European cultural blindness than of any desire to rid the world of diversi-
ty, or make the human species 'racially' pure. In this sense particularly, 
eighteenth century ethnocentrism differs profoundly from modern forms 
of racism. 
Consider Buffon's (1749) writings, for example. Here, we find that Bon-
net's 'immense variety' (1779a:212) of nature required a long and 
laborious effort of observation which eventually provided the basis of a 
system for classifying nature - both the realm of the inanimate and the 
animate- into a hierarchical table of imperceptible gradations' with God at 
the head. As Robinet would have it in representing Buffon's position; 'All 
matter is organic and living ... Inorganic matter, dead and inanimate, is a 
chimera, an impossibility' (1768:7). In effect, we are yet to arrive at the 
point where the three domains of 'animal', 'vegetable' and 'mineral' are 
relatively discontinuous with one another. 
Moreover, so-called objective description was the stock-in-trade of the 
eighteenth-century naturalist. Thus Buffon urges that, 
... in order to describe exactly, it is necessary to have seen, examined 
and compared the thing that is being described, and all this without pre-
judice, without an idea of system; without this, the description no 
longer has the character of truth which is the only thing it should em-
body (1749:25). 
Such a statement indicates that to describe nature truthfully there should 
be no rush to judgement, no hasty generalistions based on mere prejudice. 
In other words, this is hardly the approach of latter-day racism. 
Despite all this, it is also true that accounts by eighteenth century voyagers 
and naturalists of the peoples they saw are locked into another set of ex-
igencies; the need to satisfy a public's voracious appetite for stories of the 
'bizarre, the 'pittoresque' and the avowedly 'exotic'. Books by voyagers 
sold more than any other genre in the latter half of the eighteenth century 
(Smith 182 i :32). Few published accounts of the time are entirely free from 
the distortions produced by the pressure of this public demand. These 
distortions were no doubt spurred on by assertions like those of Robinet 
(1768: 168) concerning the existence of 'Negroes with tails', and of course 
there are the interminable references to the Patagonian giants. Even so 
reputable a naturalist as Commerson (the French Banks), who sailed with 
Bougainville into the Pacific, accepted as valid the stories of the giants' ex-
istence (Commerson 1766: Fol. 76). 
Such distortions could well be called fictions. This designation does not 
necessarily contradict the notion that everything in nature is somehow 
connected to everything else, or that nature is a continuous whole of in-
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finite gradations. It is merely to assert that in constructing 'fictions' people 
were either poor observers, or that the voids in the existing state of 
knowledge meant that certain phenomena appeared in isolation, and thus 
in sharp relief, when compared with other phenomena. The task, at least in 
principle, was to fill these voids, to name the visible world in its entirety, ~~J 
to bring it into the Symbolic Order (the realm of consciousness) and 11 
thereby place the exotica and the bizarre in perspective, and thus 
transform them into the 'ordinary'. Bonnet thus asks: 
. . . are we to judge the chain of Beings by our existing knowledge? 
Because we discover here and there in this chain some interruptions, 
some voids, are we to conclude that these voids are real? ... We can on-
ly begin by covering the vast exhibition rooms of nature; and among 
this innumerable multitude of diverse productions that she has assembl-
ed, how many of them are there that we have not even glimpsed and 
the existence of which we do not suspect? (1781:197) 
In effect, knowledge of the 'known' cannot serve as the model for the 
'unknown', for the models have been varied to infinity. 'Difference' is not 
excluded as a matter of course. As a result, every natural historian is at 
some point likely to resemble 
a French voyager who would expect to find in the Terres Australes the 
manners of his own country, and who would be quite scandalised not 
to see them there. The animal kingdom, too, has its Terres Australes, 
where it is probably not normal to have a brain, a heart, a stomach, etc. 
(Bonnet, 1781: 182). 
In sum, whatever else it is, eighteenth-century natural history is inclusive 
rather than exclusive. Everything is necessary in the whole that is nature. 
Ethnocentrism there may be: but it is an ethnocentrism which is profound-
ly paternalistic in its attitudes to other societies and cultures rather than 
openly hostile and aggressive- at least initially. It is thought which, at least 
in principle, strives to comprehend individuality and diversity, not to 
destroy it through fear and blind prejudice. 
The issues raised here do, to be sure, need to be unravelled still further. 
However, my purpose in drawing attention to them is simply to bring to 
mind the nature of the dilemma they evoke: the dilemma of how one can 
ever escape the confines of one's own culture in order to know the culture 
of the other. 
It is this dilemma that Claude Levi-Strauss refers to in, among other places, 
his famous essay written for UNESCO in 1952, entitled Race and History 
(1978:323-362). Levi-Strauss argues that the notion that 'one culture is 
unable to hold true judgement about another' because it is caught 'in a 
relativism without appeal' (1978:344) is true only at the level of abstract 
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logic. In fact, he says, if we look around us we will see that no culture is en-
tirely cut off from all others, and it is unlikely that this has ever been the 
case in human history. Levi-Strauss thus argues for the interconnectedness 
of all cultures, with borrowings and contacts of one kind or another 
always having taken place. Indeed, he suggests that, far from isolation be-
ing the catalyst that produces differences, it is more often than not the very 
proximity of one culture to another which leads, and has led, to energetic 
assertions of cultural identity (1978:328). For Levi-Strauss, this means, 
too, that there has never been a 'pure' race: that there are no 'innate racial 
aptitudes', as there are no 'aptitudes related to the anatomical or 
physiological constitution of black, yellow and white races' (1978:325).In 
short, there is no biological basis for race - something to which I will 
return. 
What does exist is a diversity of societies and civilisations in human 
history, each of which has been creative and progressive in its own way 
through having made contacts with other societies and civilisations. This 
diversity suggests the idea of an underlying equality of humanness in prin-
ciple between societies and cultures. 
If we accept two general points emerging from Levi-Strauss's Race and 
History, namely, that a pure race does not exist and that nearly every 
society, whether Western or not, has initially tended to characterise out-
siders as barbarians and inferiors without necessarily subjugating them, 
then, we tend to render benign the very real political ends that the term 
race and the practice of racism have been made to serve if we simply 
equate racism with ethnocentrism. From this, it can be seen that certain 
consequences stem from using the term race if, in reality, there is no such 
thing as a pure race. That is, if among all myths the myth of race is the 
'most dangerous', as Ashley Montagu (1974) argues, the political conse-
quences of using the term are also dangerous. 
The recent debate about sociobiology has seen eminent biologists such as 
Fram;ois]acob reiterate the view that the concept of race has no real scien-
tific validity (1979: 16). For Jacob, it is diversity and difference at the in-
dividual and social levels which have been the strength of human 
biological evolution. It is possible and necessary, I believe, to pursue this 
argument further. 
In the light of the work of Michel Foucault, it is possible to contend that 
the development of Biology in the nineteenth century is the condition of 
possibility of the political use of the concept, or term, race in the twen-
tieth. In The Order of Things, Foucault argues that, as opposed to the 
classifying of the visible which dominated the eighteenth century's ap-
proximation to our social and natural sciences, the nineteenth century saw 
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the emergence, in the work of Cuvier and others, of the concept of 'life'. 
Unlike the eighteenth century, the realm of the visible in the nineteenth 
became connected to the invisible, to the 'deeper' cause of life. Thus 
Foucault writes: 
From Cuvier onward, it is life in its non-perceptible, purely functional 
aspect that provides the basis of the exterior possibility of a classifica-
tion... [T]he possibility of classification now arises from the depths of 
life, from those elements most hidden from view. Before, the living be-
ing was a locality of natural classification: now, the fact of being 
classifiable is a property of the living being (1973:268). 
Fram;ois Jacob confirms this by pointing to the notion of 'organisation' 
which by the nineteenth century referred to the bidden configuration of 
beings. 'Organisation', according to Jacob, 'provided a hidden foundation 
for the bare data of description, for the being as a whole and for its func-
tioning' (1974:83). 
Through the concept of 'life', then, and the second-order concept of 
'organisation', the interiority - the hidden depths - of individuals and 
societies became an area open to speculation. These speculations were not, 
by any means, specific to Biology itself, but opened up the discipline to the 
prospect of political exploitation which had not existed before. Racism 
became one of these possibilities. 'Life', 'biology', and the 'body' (both in-
dividual and body politic) also came to constitute, in all their complexity, 
the unconscious frames of reference for all knowledge in the social 
sciences. That is to say, that only when 'life' came to occupy the place 
once occupied by 'nature' could there be discourses about the bases of 
social life, the 'health' and 'purity' of the social and individual body, as 
well as discourses about the human species as specifically and separately 
human, rather than as a species which, like any other, was part of nature. 
If Foucault's thesis in The Order of Things sets up the possibility of a link 
between 'biology', 'life' and 'race', the first volume of his History of Sex-
uality (1979)- and especially its final part ('Right of Death and Power over 
Life')- is an even more scandalous proposition concerning the idea of race. 
Before going into more detail about the argument in this text, I offer some 
remarks regarding the way Foucault's work may be appreciated, par-
ticularly in relation to his discussion of sexuality. 
As with much of Foucault's work, the volume on sexuality provides a 
relentless attempt to contest prevailing stereotypes, to undermine received 
ideas and to challenge unquestioned presuppositions; in other words, 
Foucault thinks differently from the guardians of conventional wisdom. 
This is his strength- and maybe his weakness. For Foucault, to think in the 
prevailing modes is not really thinking at all. It is nece.;;' ,~,- u. Iake this into 
account when coming to grips with his thought. 
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Take the term 'power', for instance. It is very often used to connote force 
or oppression; people often refer to the possession of power, or its lack; to 
the maintenance of order; the police; the state; the law - in short, all that is 
negative, interdictive, and repressive. For Foucault, however, power does 
not exist in a vacuum; if it is negative, it still moves against something - an 
object: and this 'object' (e.g. the delinquent, or the criminal) is itself con-
stituted by those with power and knowledge to do so. There is, therefore, 
no object of power separate from the workings of power - power working 
in conjunction with the knowledge that marks out its object. The ap-
pearance of the delinquent in history is thus a product of nineteenth-
century power configurations. 
To elaborate, I turn to sexuality and its history as it is relevant to race. Ac-
cording to Foucault, sexuality has also been constituted as an object of 
knowledge and hence power. The repression of sexuality, he argues, did 
not as is often thought reduce people to silence on the topic. In fact, it was 
necessary to talk about sex at length if it was to be repressed at all. The 
perversions and pleasures of sex therefore had to be described, specified 
and rendered quite explicit. Since the eighteenth century, pedagogical in-
stitution, for example, rather than impose a silence on the sex of children 
and adults has 
multiplied the forms of discourse on the subject; it has established 
various points of implantation for sex; it has coded contents and 
qualified speakers. Speaking about children's sex, inducing educators, 
physicians, administrators and parents to speak of it, or speaking to 
them about it, causing children themselves to talk about it, and enclos-
ing them in a web of discourses which sometimes address them, 
sometimes speak about them, or impose canonical bits of knowledge on 
them, or use them as a basis for constructing a science that is beyond 
their grasp - all this together enables us to link an intensification of the 
interventions of power to a multiplication of discourse (Foucault, 
1979:29-30). 
In keeping with this idea of a proliferation of discourses about sex, 
Foucault goes on to argue that the so-called repression of sex in the 
nineteenth-century has to be understood as another stereotype of the 
Public Culture (the domain of representations) which needs to be challeng-
ed. For, in fact, the 'repression' of sex was not the result of any 'renuncia-
tion of pleasure or a disqualification of the flesh' (122). Rather, the preoc-
cupations of the time had more to do with 'techniques for maximising life' 
(123), and the concern was more for talking about 'the body, vigor, 
longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that "ruled"' (ibid) 
thananything else. 
Consequently, sex and sexuality in the modern era from the nineteenth-
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century onwards has to be understood differently from the way we have 
been used to. Indeed it is the very domain of pleasure itself - sex - which 
now has to be seen as implicated in the workings of power to the extent · ' 
that it has become a mechanism (even a strategy) for (re) producing 'good' ~ 
health and physical perfection at both the individual and social levels. ~~ 
What Foucault had in mind here were the immense public health improve- It 
ment programmes in the nineteenth century (slum clearances, sewerage in- .I 
stallations and the like) combined, at the private level, with concern for 
improvements to the genetic stock in the family, in its 'history'. That is, by 
comparison with the earlier aristocratic concern about nobility ('blood'), 
the bourgeoisie could pass on 'good'- or perhaps 'bad'- health, depending 
on whether they were combining 'healthy' or 'degenerate' genetic stock. A 
bourgeois marriage thus became the 'consummation' of two genetic pools 
of physical and mental family attributes. The bourgeoisie's 'blood' (nobili-
ty) was therefore found in its good health or, in Foucault's words, 'the 
bourgeoisie's ''blood'' was its sex'. This sex, it is worth pointing out, is not 
the sexuality of Freud but the sex of biology, demography and public 
health, that is, the sex concerned with the 'themes of health, progeny, 
race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body ... ' (Foucault, 
1979: 147). That is, it is the sexuality which constitues 'techniques for 
maximising' life. 
It is in the context of this great concern, developed during the nineteenth 
century, for maximising the 'life' of a population that the conditions of the 
possibility for a virulent racism emerge. In their most extreme formula-
tions, racist arguments attest that there must be no mixing through sex of 
(biologically) 'inferior' and (biologically) 'superior' peoples. Such mixing 
places the healthy genetic pool at risk. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, Foucault argues, 
Racism took shape ... (racism in its modern, 'biologising', statist form); 
it was then that a whole politics of settlement (peuplement), family, 
marriage, education, social hierarchisation, and property, accompanied 
by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, 
conduct, health, and everyday life, received their colour and their 
justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of 
blood and ensuring the triumph of the race (1979:149). 
Historians have made us aware for some time now that during the nine-
teenth century, and even more so in the twentieth, public health improved 
and various diseases were eliminated. It is also generally accepted that the 
social sciences built up profiles of 'populations' based on a ceaseless 
monitoring made possible by the collection of statistical data of all kinds; 
data on health, education, employment and income, sexual practices and 
fertility, family situation, patterns of consumption, criminality, ethnicity, 
etc. These statistics provide information which makes it possible to con-
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struct the 'normal' case, namely, that which is invoked when a picture of 
society, or a representation of its 'normal' patterns of behaviour, is re-
quired. It is a monitoring which Foucault says is an integral part of 'bio-
power' - the power relating to the management of populations. Because 
'normal' behaviour does not exist outside the definition or construction of 
it, the norm in fact also produces - definitionally - a panoply of perversions 
which must be specified, studied and observed in their functioning in 
order that they may be controlled, ordered, repressed or even eliminated. 
There is therefore no perversion without the 'normal' case: no power 
without knowledge, as there is no power configuration, in Foucault's 
view, without results of all kinds being produced, i.e. deviations, perver-
sions, abnormalities. 
Thus, for Foucault, power and knowledge co-mingle with each other in 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in a way that is very different 
from that of the eighteenth. In the latter century, the juridico-discursive' 
articulation of power had the wherewithal to 'put to death' or to 'let live' 
when the monarch was thought to be under threat. The monarch, of 
course could take an individual's life under the guise of protecting himself. 
In that century, it was the protection of a centre of power- or of force 
- itself which was at stake, not the control or the management of a popula-
tion: power therefore was not inscribed in a whole network of social 
behaviours. Thus the eighteenth century produced society in which 
sovereignty was symbolised by the sword and where 'blood' was the sym-
bol of nobility - regardless of the mental or physical health of the popula-
tion or of individuals. Wars were fought between the troops of the 
sovereign and those of the enemy. Men fought and died in the name of the 
sovereign: the sovereign had the power to let live or to put people to 
death. In this kind of society, Kant's extremely revealing statement about 
the glory and honour of war (in, let us note, The Critique of judgement) 
makes very pertinent sense: 
War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for 
the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations 
that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime 
the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which 
they are able to meet with fortitude (1973, Pt. 1: 112-113) 
What we need to note, then, is that power in its twentieth century form 
can no longer be understood as being exclusively interdictory, or, as Kant 
would have it perhaps, as preserving the life of the sovereign and therefore 
the nation. Rather, power can now be seen to permeate all those practices 
which ostensibly preserve the life of a population against the threat of 
degeneration, and it is this which opens the way to racism in general and to 
Nazi eugenics in particular. As Montagu points out, the eugenists stand for 
the view that '"race mixture" should be prevented if "racial" degenera-
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tion ... is not to ensue' (1974:329). What is scandalous and no doubt dif-
ficult to accept, is that it is also the innocent concerns with well-being, 
with a healthy sexuality, with life which became the basis of tha,t which is 
anathema to life; the idea of race. A population became a race, and it is this 
factor which has potentially enormous consequences for us in the so-called 
post-modern age. The very existence of the species is indeed at stake. 
It is only necessary to recognise the incredible (by nineteenth century stan-
dards) development and elaboration of the state and its attendant Public 
Culture (illustrated in part by the 'monitoring' I mentioned earlier) in the 
twentieth century, to understand that the very notion of a private sphere 
that is not itself defined by, and is therefore part of, the Public Culture, is 
extremely doubtful. Indeed, the social sciences have contributed towards 
making the most intimate social practices and individual behaviour public 
knowledge. Today, the representation of the nation is in its Public Culture 
(cf. Horne 1986). We can be sure, too, that, if another world war broke 
out, it would indeed be between state apparatuses that have become in-
separable from the populations which are now also inseparable from the 
Public Culture. We know that the' next world war will be explicitly bet-
ween populations rather than armies. The seeds for this were sown during 
the last world war in the bombings of Dresden, London, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki - bombings which targetted civilians. Kant could not have 
understood this: he could not have understood that wars today are no 
longer between soldiers but include the civilian population. He could not 
have understood either that a world war today risks genocide on a massive 
scale, both because the weaponry is nuclear and because the targets would 
be populations. Nuclear warfare signals the end of the 'military' target. 
Now, population is pitted against population, 'race' is pitted against 'race'. 
The almost unimaginable but potential holocausts within and between 
populations should serve as a terrible warning of what is in store in a 
nuclear war. Yet, in principle at least, Foucault suggests that genocide has 
become the 'dream' of modern power - the absolute domination of one 
population over all the rest - assuming they still existed. As he puts it: 
Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be 
defended: they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone: entire 
populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the 
name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. It is as managers of 
life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have 
been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed 
(1979:137). 
In relation to the management of life, war becomes an issue of technology: 
it no longer has anything whatever to do with courage, honour or, indeed, 
manliness. A war of races is beyond morality. In terms ofKristeva's Powers 
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of Horror, this nuclear, genocidal war is abject, that is, it is not even im-
moral but entirely a-moral (unimaginable). 
The preoccupation with 'race' in our modernity, then, ushers in the 
possibility of race, nuclear war and genocide becoming inseparable from 
one another. We are now a long way indeed from the 'ethnocentrism' with 
which I began this paper. 
To sum up, I believe that the usefulness of Foucault's thesis is that we are 
provided with concepts and a framework that begin to make sense of this 
fin de siecle reality with which we are faced, as far as government and 
'race' are concerned. While I also believe that the notion that sex alone is 
at the heart of the 'norm' is questionable (for has Foucault himself not 
made sex everything here?), it seems clear that the Enlightenment and its 
thinking can no longer provide us with a framework capable of understan-
ding the kind of political and social reality we now inhabit. It is necessary 
to leave the thought of the past if we are going to live in the future. 
Furthermore, Foucault indicates that it is necessary to be less naive about 
the monitoring of populations. For while it may be innocent in intent, it 
must be recognised that power is inseparable from knowledge; knowledge 
- especially in the social sciences - is the condition of possibility for the 
workings of power in the modern era. It is not that knowledge as such is 
culpable, but that it is dangerous. 
To conclude, I would like to say that there is a difference between the past 
and our modernity on the issue of race, and that Foucault alerts us to 
something fundamental regarding our situation when he links holocaust, 
race and nuclear madness together. He connects them in a way that would 
have been unthinkable less than two centuries ago (and maybe even in 
1914) when wars were still fought between armies; when only the guilty 
were supposed to be punished, when only soldiers were supposed to die in 
war, and when the power of the king was so specific in its application. 
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